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ABSTRACT 
 
The United States (U.S.), a Signatory, but not a State Party to the Rome Statute, entered into various 
Bilateral Agreements (BIAs) with almost all Rome Statute State Parties prohibiting the arrest, 
surrender, or prosecution of the US Head of State before the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Similarly, the African Union (AU) Members, being the majority State Parties to the Rome Statute 
have decided in the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government not to cooperate with the ICC 
and to grant immunity to African Heads of State after the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued two arrest 
warrants against the Sudanese President for allegedly committing genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes. This paper examines the tension between States’ obligations under the Rome Statute 
to prosecute, surrender and arrest a head of State, including when referred to by the UN Security 
Council on the one hand, and the AU decision, the U.S. BIAs and customary international law which 
grants immunity to a sitting head of State from criminal prosecution by either an international or a 
foreign court on the other hand. It argues that States are bound by the obligations enshrined under the 
Rome Statute and both the AU decision and the BIAs are inconsistent with the duty of states to uphold 
jus cogens norms including those proscribed under the Rome Statute. 
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Introduction 
The Rome Statute1 came into force in 2002 and created the first permanent International Criminal 
Court (ICC).2 It has jurisdiction over individuals,3 regardless of their position as Head of State as 
provided under Article 27 for committing the crimes of genocide,4 crimes against humanity,5 war 
crimes6 and the crime of aggression.7 However, the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction over these crimes 
                                                          
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court  (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into Force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 
38544 (Rome Statute). 
2 Christopher J. Piranio, ‘Introduction: Reflections on the Rome Statute’ (2011) 24 Camb Rev Int’L Aff 307, 307-08; Kai 
Ambos, ‘Observations from an International Criminal Law Viewpoint’ (1996) 7 EJIL 519, 521-25. 
3 Rome Statute, art 25. The ICC has jurisdiction over the perpetrators, regardless of their positions, who must be over 18 
years old at the time of the commission of the crimes. 
4 ibid, art 6. 
5 ibid, art 7. 
6 ibid, art 8.  
7 ibid, arts 8bis and 15ter; Marina Mancini, ‘A Brand New Definition for the Crime of Aggression: The Kampala Outcome’ 
(2012) 81 Nord J Int’l L 227, 247; David Scheffer, ‘The Complex Crime of Aggression under the Rome Statute’ (2010) 3 
LJIL 897, 903. 
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subject to the complementary principle,8 where the national courts of State Parties will be the forum 
conveniens9 or has first-hand jurisdiction over the perpetrators compared to the ICC.  
 
Nevertheless, national courts cease their position as the forum conveniens if either the situation has 
been referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council (UNSC) under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute 
or if the national courts of the State Parties are unable10 or unwilling11 genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution. As a result, States are required to arrest and surrender the alleged 
perpetrators, including the Head of State upon request made by the ICC for investigation or 
prosecution. Since genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes have been allegedly committed 
in the territory of the Sudan, a non-Party to the Rome Statute, it has been referred to the ICC by the 
UNSC under Article 13(b) via Resolution 159312 acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.13  
 
Consequently, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) issued two arrest warrants14 against President Omar 
Al-Bashir for allegedly committed crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide in Darfur, Sudan 
accordingly. Since many Africans, particularly three African leaders have been targeted, charged and 
prosecuted before the ICC, the latter has been accused for being biased and Afrocentric.15 Hence, to 
prevent the Sudanese President from being arrested and brought before the ICC,16 the African Union 
(AU) requested the UNSC to defer his indictment pursuant to Article 16 of the Rome Statute prior17 
and after18 the PTC issued the first arrest warrant. However, it received no response from the UNSC19 
but instead the UNSC insisted to refer the situation to the ICC.  
 
Thus, the AU, through its Assembly of Heads of State and Governments decided not to cooperate with 
the ICC to execute the arrest warrant,20 even though 34 out of 54 of the AU Members are Parties to 
the Rome Statute. As a result, President Omar Al-Bashir was neither arrested nor surrendered to the 
                                                          
8 Rome Statute, Preambles [4], [6], [10] and arts 1, 17(1)(a) and (b); Fatou B. Bensouda, ‘Reflections from the International 
Criminal Court Prosecutor’ (2012) 45 Case W Res J Int’l L 505, 507; Antonio Cassese, ‘The Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections’ (1999) 10 EJIL 144, 158. 
9 Latin words which mean ‘the most appropriate court to solve a particular dispute or case’. 
10 Rome Statute, art 17(3).  
11 ibid, arts 17(2) and 20(3).  
12 UNSC Res 1593 (31 March 2005) UN Doc S/Res/1593; Matthias Neuner, ‘The Darfur Referral of the Security Council 
and the Scope of the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 8 YBIHL 320, 321.  
13 Rosa Aloisi, ‘A Tale of Two Institutions: The United Nations Security Council and the International Criminal Court’ 
(2013) 13 Int’l Crim LR 147, 150-51; Dapo Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of 
Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits’ (2003) 1 JICJ 618, 647-48. 
14 Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (Warrant of Arrest) ICC-02/05-01/09 Pre-T Ch I (12 July 2010); Prosecutor 
v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (Warrant of Arrest) ICC-02/05-01/09 Pre-T Ch I (4 March 2009); Johan D. Van Der Vyver, 
‘Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir’ (2010) 104 AJIL 461, 462-63. 
15 Such as from Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Mali, Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire. However, 
such allegation is baseless where all of these cases are brought before the ICC by States’ own referrals and ICC Prosecutor’s 
own initiatives. See Charles Chernor Jalloh, ‘Regionalizing International Criminal Law’ (2009) 9 Int’l Crim LR 445, 462-
63. 
16 AU Peace and Security Council, ‘142nd Meeting Communique’ (21 July 2008) AU Doc PSC/MIN/Comm(CXLII) [3]. 
17 AU Peace and Security Council 151st Meeting, ‘Report of the Implementarion of Communique of 142nd Meeting of the 
Peace and Security Council held on 21st July 2008 on the Sudan’ (21 July 2008) AU Doc PSC/MIN/Comm(CXLII) [3]. 
18 See, among others, Letter Dated 6 March 2009 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council (6 March 2009) AU Doc 
S/2009/144; Assembly of the African Union, ‘Decision on the Application by the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Prosecutor for the Indictment of the President of the Republic of the Sudan’ (1-3 February 2009) AU Doc Assembly/AU/Dec. 
220(XII) [3]. 
19 Dire Tladi, ‘The African Union and the International Criminal Court: The Battle for the Soul of International Law: Africa 
and the International Criminal Court’ (2009) 34 S Afr YBIL 57, 68. 
20 Thirteenth Ordinary Session Assembly of the African Union, ‘Decision on the Meeting of African State Parties to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’ (1-3 July 2009) AU Doc Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev. 1, [10]. 
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ICC when he visited Malawi,21 and he was even invited to visit Chad22 and Kenya,23 both being State 
Parties to the Rome Statute.  
 
Similarly, after it withdrew from ratifying the Rome Statute which was signed during Clinton’s 
Administration,24 the United States (U.S.) entered into various Bilateral Immunity Agreements 
(BIAs)25 with the Signatories, Parties and non-State Parties to the Rome Statute pursuant to Article 
98(2) of the Rome Statute. The BIAs prohibit its Parties to surrender the U.S.’ “persons”26 to the ICC 
if found to have committed the crimes on the territory of that States. By virtue of these BIAs, the U.S. 
does not favour the ICC even though it has been one of the ardent supporters of the international 
criminal justice since World War II.27 
 
Meanwhile, as a substantive international law, jus cogens28 norm and customary international law29 
prohibit the act of aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Once these crimes 
have been committed, States have the obligation to prosecute or to extradite the alleged perpetrators 
the alleged perpetrators irrespective of their positions.30 At the same, customary international law also 
provides both the sitting31 and former32 Head of State with immunity from being prosecuted before 
any foreign courts. However, the immunity of the Head of State is a matter of procedural law where 
it can be waived by the State itself or by the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for 
committing international crimes. 
 
Thus, this paper examines two questions: first, whether States have the obligation under international 
law to arrest, surrender and prosecute the alleged perpetrators of the crimes such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes before its own court or by the competent tribunals even against the 
sitting Head of State; and second, whether the decision of the AU and the BIAs are contrary to 
international law for providing impunity to alleged perpetrators of these crimes. It argues that States 
are bound under international law to arrest, surrender and prosecute the alleged perpetrators and that 
both the AU decision and the BIAs are inconsistent with the duty of states to uphold jus cogens norms 
including those proscribed under the Rome Statue. 
 
Prohibition Under Jus Cogens Norm and Customary International Law 
 
The conflict arises between the crimes enumerated under the ICC jurisdiction and both the AU 
decision and the BIAs. This is because the former are prohibited both under jus cogens norm and 
                                                          
21 He attended a Summit of the Common Market for Eastern & Southern Africa (COMESA) in October 2011. 
22 He was invited to attend a Summit of the Sahel-Saharan States in August 2011. See Gwen P. Barnes, ‘The International 
Criminal Court’s Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms: The Indictment of President Omar Al Bashir’ (2010) 34 Fordham 
Int’l LJ 1584, 1609.  
23 He was invited to attend Kenya’s Constitutional Celebration in August 2010. See <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-
updates/kenya-refuses-arrest-sudanese-president-omar-al-bashir-2010-08-27> Accessed 12 February 2015.  
24 Jean Galbraith, ‘The Bush Administration’s Response to the International Criminal Court’ (2003) 21 Berkeley J Int’l L 
683, 686; John R Bolton, ‘International Criminal Court: Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’ (US Department of 
State, 6 May 2002) <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.Htm> Accessed 15 December 2014. 
25 Also known as “Impunity Agreement”, “Article 98 Agreement” and “Non-Surrender Agreement”.   
26 “Persons” under the BIAs has been defined as the current and former Government officials, employees (including 
contractors) or military personnel or nationals of one Party.   
27 Christopher Kip Hale and Maanasa K Reddy, ‘A Meeting of the Minds in Rome: Ending the Circular Conundrum of the 
US-ICC Relationship’, (2013) 12 Wash U Global Stud L Rev 581, 583; Markus Wagner, ‘The ICC and Its Jurisdiction-
Myths, Misperceptions and Realities’, (2003) 7 Max Planck YB UN L 409, 416. 
28 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, 
art 53. Thereafter, VCLT. Jus cogens norm is a peremptory norm of general international law accepted and recognised by 
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted, unless with subsequent 
norm having similar character. 
29 Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ‘The Grave Breaches Regime as Customary International Law’ (2009) 7 JICJ 683, 684; Nirmala 
Chandrahasan, ‘The Continuing Relevance of Customary International Law in the Development of International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2009) 21 Sri Lanka J Int’l L 55, 61. 
30 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Crimes: “Jus Cogens” and “Obligatio Erga Omnes”’ (1996) 59 LCP 63, 66. 
31 Immunity ratione personae. 
32 Immunity ratione materiae. 
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customary international law but the latter are trying to avoid prosecution of the alleged perpetrators. 
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT) defines jus cogens as “a 
peremptory norm of general international law accepted and recognised by the entire international 
community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted”.  
 
Even though Article 6 of the VCLT provides that every State has capacity to conclude treaties, but 
such treaties must be in line with jus cogens norms, as the highest position or benchmark for States to 
conclude treaties among them33 pursuant to Article 53 of the VCLT. In other words, any treaty entered 
into between States shall be void if it violates the peremptory norm of general international law. 
However, jus cogens is controversial since Article 53 of the VCLT does not provide any objective test 
on what qualifies or constitutes peremptory34 since it is an unwritten norm35 and lacks of formality.36  
 
Nonetheless, the International Law Commission (ILC) in its Commentaries on the Law of Treaties 
contended that the interpretation of jus cogens is to be reflected to State practice and in the 
jurisprudence of international tribunals,37 or customary international law. Yet, the ILC suggested a 
few examples of the jus cogens norms in its Commentaries, such as the prohibition of aggression, and 
the commission of international crimes like genocide, trade in slaves, and piracy.38 Furthermore, 
international law scholars, such as Bassiouni39 and Crawford40 argued that international crimes under 
the ICC jurisdiction are considered as jus cogens. Thus, States can conclude any treaty so long as it 
does not provide impunity to the international crimes like genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and aggression.  
 
The implication of recognising the crimes as jus cogens is that, States have the obligation to prosecute 
the alleged perpetrators or extradite them so that they will not walk unpunished,41 known as obligatio 
erga omnes. This is because, it would not be considered as peremptory norm of international law if it 
does not carry any obligation on the part of the States to punish the commission of the said crimes.  
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Barcelona Traction Case42 also held that it is the obligation 
of every States towards the whole international community to prohibit the commission of international 
crimes, known as obligation erga omnes. Thus, when States have the obligation to prevent the 
commission of these crimes under international law, States also supposed to have the obligation and 
ability to punish the alleged perpetrators once the crimes have been committed.43  
 
Even if the prohibition of the act or committing the crimes under the jus cogens is controversial due 
to its lack of formality and in its unwritten form, these crimes are still prohibited by the international 
community under customary international law.44 As one of the sources of international law,45 Article 
38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute defined customary international law as “evidence of a general practice 
                                                          
33 Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija (Judgment) IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) [153]; Alexander Orakhelashvili, 
Peremptory Norms in International Law (OUP 2008) 135-37. 
34 Nina H B Jørgensen, The Responsibility of States for International Crimes (OUP 2000) 89. 
35 Gordon A. Christenson, ‘Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International Society’ (1987) 28 Va J Int’l L 585, 
589. 
36 Markus Petsche, ‘Jus Cogens as a Vision of the International Legal Order’, (2010) 29 Penn St Int’l L Rev 233, 242. 
37 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’ (1966) 2 UNYBILC 187, 248 
[3]. 
38 Ibid, 247 [1] and 248 [3]. 
39 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Other Serious Violations of 
Human Rights’ in M Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), Post-Conflict Justice (Transnational Publishers, 2002) 390; Bassiouni, 
International Crimes (n 30) 68. 
40 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8 edn, OUP 2012). 
41 Bassiouni, International Crimes (n 30) 65. 
42 Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited (Judgment) [1970] ICJ Rep 3 [33]-[34]; Furundzija (Judgment) 
(n 33) [151]. 
43 Furundzija (Judgment) (n 33) [152]; Bassiouni, International Crimes (n 30) 66. 
44 George A Finch, ‘The Nuremberg Trial and International Law’, (1947) 41 AJIL 20, 26; Max Radin, ‘Justice at Nuremberg’ 
(1946) 24 Foreign Aff 369, 371; Georg Schwarzenberger, ‘Judgment of Nuremberg’ (1946) 21 Tul L Rev 329, 332. 
45 Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) art 38(1). 
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accepted as law” where it requires States practice as well as acknowledgement from the States46 in 
order to legally bind all States.47  
 
As the ILC has suggested abovementioned, the interpretation of jus cogens is to be reflected through 
State practice and jurisprudence of the international tribunals. Many international criminal tribunals 
have been established to punish the alleged perpetrators of the crimes, such as the establishment of the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT)48 and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE).49  
 
In addition, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) under Resolution 95(1)50 acknowledged the IMT’s 
jurisdiction over the crimes against peace,51 war crimes52 and crimes against humanity53 as well as its 
decision. Furthermore, the subsequent tribunals after the IMT, such as the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)54 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR)55 also based their jurisdictions on the IMT principles, including the Rome Statute.56  
 
By virtue of the establishment of these tribunals, there were numbers of the alleged perpetrators who 
were found guilty for committing the crimes, including the Head of State, such as Admiral Doenitz, 
being both the Chancellor and the successor of the Third Reich of the State of Germany after Hitler 
committed suicide57 and Jean Kambanda,58 the first Head of Government to be criminally liable for 
committing genocide against the Rwandan Tutsis.59  Also, the ILC defined the types of crimes against 
peace and security of mankind under its Draft Article 160 based on the jurisdiction of the IMT. Thus, 
it proves that the crimes under the ICC jurisdiction are prohibited under customary international law. 
In addition, as rules governing international humanitarian law which based on customary international 
law, the Geneva Conventions 1949 are adopted based on the Hague Conventions 189961 and 190762 
to outlaw war crimes. Even though not all provisions under the four Geneva Conventions 194963 and 
                                                          
46 Pierre-Hugues Verdier and Eril Voeten, ‘Precedent, Compliance, and Change in Customary International Law: An 
Explanatory Theory’ (2014) 108 AJIL 389, 413; Christian Dahlman, ‘The Function of Opinio Juris in Customary 
International Law’ (2012) 81 Nord J Int’l L 327, 330. 
47 Michael P Scharf, ‘Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law’ (2014) 20 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 305, 311; 
Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, ‘Methods for The Identification of Customary International Law in the International Court of 
Justice's Jurisprudence 2000-2009’ (2011) ICLQ 681, 686. 
48 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT Charter). 
49 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE Charter). 
50 UNG Res 95(1) (11 December 1946) UN Doc A/RES/1/95; Antonio Cassese, ‘Affirmation of the Principles of 
International Law Recognized by the Charters of the Nurnberg Tribunal’ (2009) United Nations Audiovisual Library of 
International Law 3; Christian Tomuschat, ‘International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent of Nuremberg Confirmed’, 
(1994) 5 Crim L F 237, 238; Franz B Schick, ‘The Nuremberg Trial and the International Law of the Future’ (1947) 41 AJIL 
770, 770; Quincy Wright, ‘The Nuernberg Trial’ (1946) 37 J Crim L & Criminology 477, 478. 
51 IMT Charter, art 6(a); IMTFE Charter, art 5(a). 
52 IMT Charter art 6(b); IMTFE Charter, art 5(b). 
53 IMT Charter, art 6(c); IMTFE Charter, art 5(c). See Sheri P Rosenberg, ‘The Nuremberg Trials: A Reapprairal and Their 
Legacy’, (2006) 27 Cardozo L Rev 1549, 1550. 
54 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY Statute). 
55 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR Statute). 
56 Rome Statute, arts 6-8bis; Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, ‘The General Principles of International Criminal Law Set out in 
Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC Statute’ (2004) 2 JICJ 38, 43. 
57 Willis Smith, ‘The Nuremberg Trials’ (1946) 32 ABAJ 390, 390. 
58 Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTR-97-23-A (19 October 2000); Prosecutor v Jean 
Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-97-23-S (4 September 1998). 
59 Erik Møse, ‘Main Achievements of the ICTR’, (2005) 3 JICJ 920, 935. 
60 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the 
Work of Its Forty-Eight Session’, (1996) 2 UNYBILC 17, [7]. 
61 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899 (adopted 29 July 1899, entered into force 4 September 1900). 
Hereafter, Hague Convention 1899. 
62 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907 (adopted 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910). 
Henceforth, Hague Convention 1907. 
63 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva 12 
August 1949 (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950). Hereafter, Geneva Convention I; Convention 
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its Additional Protocols64 are up to jus cogens level, the principles and prohibitions under Paragraphs 
(1) and (2) of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Convention IV are jus cogens.65  
 
Common Article 3 stipulates about the concerned with the individual and the physical treatment to 
which he is entitled as a human being during the conflicts. These provisions have been incorporated 
into the Rome Statute under Article 8(2)(c). Even though Common Article 3 only applicable to 
conflicts not of an international character, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its 
Commentaries66 stresses that Common Article 3 also “… valid everywhere and under all 
circumstances and as being above and outside war itself” and further upheld by the ICJ in Nicaragua 
Case67 and the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Delalic.68  
 
Thus, when such provisions are applicable at all times and in all circumstances it constitutes as norms 
of jus cogens where it protects basic considerations of humanity. The Geneva Conventions 1949 also 
formed part of customary international law when it is ratified by 196 States, including all UN Member 
States and UN Observers, a near universal acceptance. 
 
The UNGA also adopted Resolution 96(1)69 in 1946, which affirmed that genocide is prohibited under 
international law. The prohibition of genocide, which is a jus cogens norms was crystallised and 
codified into the Genocide Convention.70 Article I of the Genocide Convention stipulates that genocide 
is a crime under international law which all the Parties undertake to prevent and punish the alleged 
perpetrators regardless of their positions pursuant to Article IV.  
Even though it is not universally ratified, where only 142 States are Parties to it, States which are not 
Parties to the Genocide Convention are still bound under these obligations This is because, the 
principles under the Genocide Convention are principles which are recognised by civilised nations, in 
line with the ICJ Advisory Opinion in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case.71 However, 
before States exercise the said obligations, it is important to resolve whether such obligations can be 
exercised upon the Head of State who enjoys immunity under customary international law. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
(II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva 12 
August 1949 (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950). Thereafter, Geneva Convention II; Convention 
(III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva 12 August 1949 (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 
October 1950). Hereafter, Geneva Convention III; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Geneva 12 August 1949 (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950), henceforth, Geneva Convention 
IV. 
64 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (adoted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978). Hereafter, Additiol Protocol I; 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force7 December 1978). Thereafter, Additional Protocol 
II; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Adoption of an Additional 
Distinctive Emblem (adopted 8 December 2005, entered into force 14 January 2007. Hereafter, Additional Protocol III. 
65 Theodor Meron, ‘The Geneva Conventions and Public International Law’ (2009) 91 IRRC 619, 620, 624; Rafael Nieto-
Navia, ‘International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) and International Humanitarian Law', in Lal Chand Vohrah et al (ed.), 
Man’s Inhumanity to Man: Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (Kluwer Law International, 2003) 
595, 636. 
66 ICRC, ‘Commentary to Common Article 3’ in Jean Pictet (ed.), Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (ICRC 1958) 44. 
67 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits, Judgments) 
[1986] ICJ Rep 14. [218]. 
68 Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic et al (Judgment) IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001) [150]. 
69 UNGA Res 96(1) (11 December 1946) UN Doc A/RES/1/96). 
70 UNGA Res 260(III) (9 December 1948) UN Doc A/RES/3/260); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide 1948 (adopted 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 1021. Hereafter, 
Genocide Convention. 
71 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime Of Genocide (Advisory Opinion) [1951] 
ICJ Rep 15 [23]. 
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Customary International Law on the Immunity of the Head of State and Governments 
 
Before the outbreak of World War I, the ruler and State were considered as one and treated alike while 
enjoying absolute immunity or sovereign immunity72 under the principle of par in parem imperium 
non habet imperium.73 It reflects the principle of sovereignty of States and subjecting States to a 
foreign court’s jurisdiction amounting to a violation of the principle of State sovereignty or equality.74  
 
However, this sovereign immunity was no longer applied after the outbreak of World War where many 
rulers or the Head of State have been using their immunity for the impunity in committing crimes. 
Still, customary international law provides the Head of State with immunity ratione personae 
(personal or private immunity) and immunity ratione materiae (official immunity).75 This customary 
rule was crystallised and codified into the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR)76 and 
ratified by almost all UN Member States.77  
 
Articles 29 and 31 of the VCDR provides that the diplomats shall be inviolable, not subject to arrest 
and enjoy an absolute immunity from criminal prosecution. Even though immunity under the VCDR 
only covers diplomats, their staffs and family, the ICJ in both the Arrest Warrant Case78 and Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Case79 ruled that immunity under the VCDR should also be extended 
to State high ranking officials, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. However, their immunities are temporal, belong to the State and can be waived by the State 
at any time pursuant to Article 32 of the VCDR.  
  
Immunity ratione personae is applied to the sitting Head of State, whether he is travelling abroad or 
not and also covers both his official and private acts as long as he is in the office80 even he has 
committed international crimes.81 Once the reasonable period of time comes to an end, either when he 
leaves the receiving State or at the expiry of his tenure or appointment as the diplomatic agent, the 
Head of State is no longer protected under immunity ratione personae. Still, immunity ratione 
materiae, takes over but only limited to all official acts or conducts performed while he or she being 
the sitting Head of State.82  
 
                                                          
72 Hallie Ludsin, ‘Returning Sovereignty to the People’ (2013) 46 Vand J Transnat’l L 97, 102; Hans Corell, ‘Sovereignty 
and Humanity: Reality and Possibility’ (2007) 36 Denv J Int’l L & Pol’y 1, 1-2; Jerrold L Mallory, ‘Resolving the Confusion 
over Head of State Immunity: The Defined Rights of Kings’, (1986) 86 Colum L Rev 169, 170; Robert Lansing, ‘Notes on 
Sovereignty in a State’ (1907) 1 AJIL 105 124. 
73 This Latin maxim means ‘an equal has no power over an equal’. See Anthony J Colangelo, ‘Jurisdiction, Immunity, 
Legality, and Jus Cogens’ (2013) 14 Chinese JIL 53, 59-60; Beth Van Schaack, ‘Par in Parem Imperium Non Habet 
Complementarity and the Crime of Aggression’ (2012) 10 JICJ 133; Yoram Dinstein, ‘Par in Parem Non Habet Imperium’, 
(1966) 1 Isr L Rev 407. 
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75 Mark A. Summers, ‘Diplomatic Immunity Ratione Personae: Did the International Court of Justice Create a New 
Customary Law Rule in Congo v. Belgium’ (2007) 16 Mich St J Int’l L 459, 467-68. 
76 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 (adopted 18 April 1961, entered into force 24 April 1964) 500 UNTS 
95. Hereafer, VCDR. 
77 There are 190 States out of 193 UN Member States are Parties to the VCDR. See 
<https://treaties.un.org/ages/untsonline.aspx?id=2> Accessed 24 November 2014. 
78 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium)  (Judgment) [2002] ICJ 
Rep 3 [51]. 
79 Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France)  (Judgment) [2008] 
ICJ Rep 177 [170]. 
80 Eileen Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’(UN Audiovisual Library of International Law 2009) 1, 4; 
Rosanne Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal Law and International Human 
Rights Law (OUP 2008) 80; Michael A. Tunks, ‘Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of Head-of-State Immunity’ 
(2002) 52 Duke LJ 651, 655. 
81 Dapo Akande and Sangeeta Shah, ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts’ 
(2011) 21 EJIL 815, 818-19. 
82 VCDR, art 39(2).  
Fareed Mohd Hassan 
40     Malaysian Journal of Syariah and law | ايزيلامب نوناقلاو ةعيرشلا ةلجم | Vol 7, No.1, June 2019 
The House of Lords in Pinochet83 held that the Head of State will not be protected under immunity 
ratione materiae if he has performed certain acts, in this case the act of torture which is outside his 
official duty while being the Head of State. In other words, States are bound to protect the inviolability 
and immunity of the Head of State as long as he has acted or performed official acts while being in 
the office as upheld by the ICJ in Diplomatic and Consular Staff Case.84 
 
Furthermore, in order to prevent impunity, the Head of State will not be protected under both ratione 
personae and ratione materiae if he is allegedly to have committed international crimes, such as 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity as ruled by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant Case.85 
This practice is not new and has been exercised by the international tribunals after the outbreak of 
World War I and II,86 such as the prosecution of Admiral Doenitz87 before the IMT, which was 
affirmed by the UNGA in Resolution 95(1).  
 
Furthermore, both President Slobodan Milosevic88 of Serbia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
President Charles Taylor89 of Liberia were also been prosecuted before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) respectively 
for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity even though both of them were the sitting 
Head of State at the time of their indictment.90 
 
These practices have been incorporated into the Rome Statute pursuant to Article 27 where immunity 
of the Heads of State shall not bar the ICC from exercising its jurisdiction over the alleged perpetrators. 
Since the crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity have been allegedly committed 
in Sudan, it has been referred to the ICC by the UNSC under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
 
As one of the alleged perpetrators of these crimes, the ICC has issued two arrest warrants against the 
Sudanese President, even though he is the sitting Head of State of a non-Party to the Rome Statute. 
However, the AU decided to let him free and not to arrest him even after the issuance of two arrest 
warrants. 
The African Union’s Decision  
 
The decision of the Assembly of the AU creates a conflict of obligations among the AU Members not 
to arrest President Omar Al-Bashir as decided by its Assembly91 and to cooperate with the ICC to 
arrest and surrender him according to UNSC Resolution 1593.  
 
Thus, these situations create three legal questions, inter alia: whether the decision of the AU Assembly 
binds its Members; whether Sudan and other State Parties to the Rome Statute which are also the AU 
                                                          
83 Ex Parte Pinochet; R v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others; Ex Parte 
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84 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) (Judgment) 
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85 Arrest Warrant Case (n 78) [61]; David S. Koller, ‘Immunities of Foreign Ministers: Paragraph 61 of the Yerodia 
Judgement as It Pertains to the Security Council and the International Criminal Court’, (2004) 20 Am U Int’l L Rev 7, 14, 
17, 19; Dire Tladi, ‘The ICC Decisions on Chad and Malawi on Cooperation, Immunities, and Article 98’, (2013) 11 JICJ 
199, 220. 
86 John Dugard, ‘Immunity, Human Rights and International Crimes’, (2005) J S Afr L 482, 482-83. 
87 Smith, The Nuremberg Trials (n 57) 390. 
88 Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic et al (Second Amended Indictment) IT-02-54-T (28 July 2004).  
89 Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor (Judgment) SCSL-03-01-A (26 September 2013); Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay 
Taylor (Judgment) SCSL-03-01-T T Ch II (18 May 2012); Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor (Indictment) SCSL-03-
01-I  (7 March 2003). 
90 Sarah M H Nouwen, ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Immunity of Taylor: The Arrest Warrant Case Continued’ 
(2005) 18 LJIL 645, 667-68; Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmány, ‘Prosecutor v. Taylor: The Status of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and Its Implications for Immunity’ (2005) 18 LJIL 299, 319. 
91 Thirteenth Ordinary Session Assembly of the African Union, ‘Decision on the Meeting of African State Parties to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’ (n 20) [10]. 
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Members have a legal obligation to arrest and surrender the Sudanese President under Article 89 of 
the Rome Statute; and whether the AU Members have a legal obligation to carry out the UNSC 
decision under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as Members to the UN.   
 
Even though there is no express provision under the AU Constitutive Act (CA); the founding treaty 
which established the AU92 on whether the decision of its Assembly93 binds all its Members, it can be 
drawn from Article 23 of the CA.94 Article 23 of the CA stresses that, in the event when the AU 
Members failed to comply with the decisions of the AU Assembly, they may be subjected to sanctions 
which will be determined by the Assembly accordingly.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that the Assembly is the supreme organ of the AU,95 its decision should have 
been binding upon its Members. This can be seen where some of the AU Members have complied 
with such decision where President Omar Al-Bashir has not been arrested even though he has visited 
many States, such as Chad96 Kenya,97 and Malawi98 even after the arrest warrants have been issued by 
the PTC.  
 
However, it is argued that, since all of the States that Sudanese had visited are also Parties to the Rome 
Statute, these States have also breached their obligation to arrest and surrender the Sudanese President 
to the ICC as required under Article 89 of the Rome Statute.99 Thus, these States have violated Article 
26 of the VCLT for failure to comply with their treaty obligation. 
 
Not only the above mentioned States have not acted as required under the Rome Statute, Sudan also 
refused to apprehend its own Head of State to the ICC even after Resolution 1593 was invoked by the 
UNSC. As mentioned earlier, immunity can be waived by the State.100 Since Sudan refused to 
cooperate with the ICC to arrest and surrender its President, it means that Sudan refused to waive the 
immunity accorded its President.  
Therefore, he should have still been protected under immunity ratione personae as provided under 
both customary international law and VCDR.101 Furthermore, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, neither the 
ICC nor the UNSC can remove the immunity attached to the Sudanese President because the ICC is 
an independent court and not an organ of the UN, even though the UNSC is acting under Chapter VII 
                                                          
92 The Constitutive Act, art 2. 
93 Ibid, art 7. 
94 Max Du Plessis and Christopher Gevers, ‘Balancing Competing Obligations: The Rome Statute and AU Decisions’ (2011) 
Institute for Security Studies Papers 1, 3.  
95 The Constitutive Act, art 6(2).  
96 Barnes, The International Criminal Court’s Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms (n 22). 
97 See (n 23). 
98 See (n 21); Mwiza Jo Nkhata, ‘Along Came Omar Al Bashir to Malawi: International Criminal Law and the Immunity of 
Heads of State’, (2011) 5 Malawi L J 149, 154. 
99 Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (Decison on the Non-Compliance of the Republic of Chad with the 
Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court Regarding the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahamd Al-Bashir) ICC-
02/05-01/09 Pre-T Ch II (26 March 2013); Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (Decison Pursuant to Article 87(7) 
of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court 
with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahamd Al-Bashir) ICC-02/05-01/09 Pre-T Ch I (12 December 
2011); Alexander K. A. Greenwalt, ‘Introductory Note to the International Criminal Court: Decisions Pursuant to Article 
87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi and the Republic of Chad to Comply with the 
Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir & 
African Union Response’ (2012) 51 ILM 393, 393. 
100 VCDR, art 32. 
101 <https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iii-3&chapter=3&lang=en> Accessed 22 
February 2015. 
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under the UN Charter.102 Thus, Article 27 of the Rome Statute cannot be used to remove the immunity 
attached to President Omar Al-Bashir under customary international law. 103 
 
Nevertheless, even if the decision of the AU Assembly is binding on its Members and the Sudanese 
President should have immune under immunity ratione personae as the sitting Head of State, it is 
argued that such a decision is void and the immunity is not applicable to him. This is because, the 
crimes that President Omar Al-Bashir has been charged are prohibited under jus cogens104 and 
customary international law105 which does not recognise impunity.  
 
Even though he has immunity under customary international law and the VCDR,106 the ICJ in the 
Arrest Warrant Case107 and the practice under customary international law have shown that immunity 
of the Head of State, both ratione personae and ratione materiae will no longer be applicable if the 
Head of State is alleged to have been committed international crimes, such as genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.  
 
Unlike the situation in Kenya; a State Party to the Rome Statute, immunity of President Uhuru 
Kenyatta108 has been waived by Kenya under Article 27 of the Rome Statute when the case has been 
referred to the ICC by the Prosecutor under Article 13(c) of the Rome Statute. This is because, 
immunity of the Head of State will be automatically removed under Article 27 of the Rome Statute 
when Kenya ratified the Rome Statute.109  
 
In addition, Kenya has also domesticated110 the Rome Statute, called the Kenyan International Crimes 
Act 2008 where Section 27(1) of the Act also reflects the same principle under Article 27 of the Rome 
Statute.111 Therefore, the immunity of the Head of State of Kenya has been waived domestically and 
through Article 27 of the Rome Statute which render him been referred to the ICC.  
 
Besides, it is argued that the AU decision is contrary to some of the provisions of the AU itself. For 
instance, Preamble 9 and Article 3(h) stipulate that the AU is determined to promote and protect 
human and people’s rights. However, since the AU Assembly refused to arrest and surrender the 
Sudanese President as the alleged perpetrator of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes to 
the ICC, it denied the rights of the victims of these crimes for justice. In addition, Article 4(o) of the 
CA elucidates that the AU respects the sanctity of human life, condemns and rejects the impunity.  
 
Nonetheless, the alleged perpetrator of the crimes is still free at larger and not even been arrested and 
surrendered before the ICC for trials even though he has been allegedly committed international 
crimes. Furthermore, Article 3(e) of the CA also provides that the objective of the AU is to encourage 
international cooperation by taking due account of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR). But, the AU refused to cooperate with the ICC and disregard the UNSC 
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S/RES/955; Joy Gordon, ‘The United Nations Security Council and the Emerging Crisis of Legitimacy’ (2014) 9 YJIA 40, 
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111 Antonina Okuta, ‘National Legislation for Prosecution of International Crimes in Kenya’ (2009) 7 JICJ 1063, 1073. 
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Resolution 1593 which is based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter to arrest and surrender the Sudanese 
President.  
 
The action of Sudan for failure to comply with UNSC Resolution 1593 to cooperate with the ICC by 
arresting and surrendering it President raises another key issue; whether it is bound to arrest its 
President even though it is not a Party to the Rome Statute. This is because, Article 34 of the VCLT 
provides that any obligation under the treaty cannot be imposed upon States which are not Parties to 
the treaty without its consent. Even though Sudan is a Signatory to the Rome Statute, it has decided 
not to ratify it112 and thus it has no obligation to perform any obligations enshrined under the Rome 
Statute.  
 
However, Article 38 of the VCLT provides that even though a treaty is not binding upon a third State, 
that is, a non-Party without its consent, that third State is still bound if the issue at hand is customary 
rule of international law. Thus, Sudan is still bound under international law because the crimes which 
have been allegedly perpetrated by the Sudanese President are both jus cogens norms and prohibited 
under customary international law.   
 
In addition, Sudan is still bound to arrest and surrender its President under Article 25 of the UN Charter 
by virtue of its position as a UN Member since 1956.113 Article 25 of the UN Charter provides that 
every Members agreed to accept and carry out the decision of the UNSC and has been reiterated by 
the ICJ in the case of South West Africa.114 Since its President has been referred to the ICC under 
Resolution 1593 acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Sudan is bound to accept such referral 
and arrest its President to be surrendered to the ICC and thus, notwithstanding the AU decision. 
Therefore, the immunity attached to President Omar-Al-Bashir still has been shifted by virtue of the 
UNSC referral.  
 
Furthermore, even if it is argued that the decision of the AU is binding upon its Members, Article 103 
of the UN Charter stipulates that the obligation of the UN Charter prevails if there is a conflict between 
obligations under the UN Charter and under other treaties.115 This principle has been illustrated in the 
Lockerbie Case.116 In this case, Libya refused to extradite two of its citizen allegedly accused for the 
Pan Am flight as required under the Montreal Convention to the U.S. or the United Kingdom. Libya 
contended that it has the right to exercise its jurisdiction over the alleged accused under the treaty.  
 
However, the U.S. argued that such a right could not be exercised because it was superseded by the 
UNSC Resolutions 731, 748 and 883 by virtue of Article 25 and 103 of the UN Charter.117 The ICJ 
ruled that since UNSC Resolutions 731, 748 and 883 were not explicitly required Libya to extradite 
two of its citizens to the U.S. or the United Kingdom for trials, therefore Libya has no obligation to 
do so notwithstanding the Resolutions adopted by the UNSC.118  
 
Applying the same principle into the issue at hand, Paragraph 2 of Resolution 1593 explicitly 
mentioned that the Government of Sudan must cooperate fully with the ICC.119 Therefore, Sudan has 
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the obligation under Resolution 1593 to surrender its President to the ICC as requested by the UNSC 
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
 
In addition, by virtue of the words “all States” and “regional organisation” under the same Paragraph 
2 of Resolution 1593, it should have also bind other the AU and other States to surrender the Sudanese 
President to cooperate fully with the ICC. This is in line with Article 53 of the UN Charter where the 
Security Council can utilise the regional arrangement available to enforce any action under its 
authority. Since the ICC has issued two arrest warrants against the Sudanese President which require 
States’ cooperation, all States, regardless of being Parties or non-Parties to the Rome Statute are bound 
to arrest and surrender him to the ICC under Article 25 and 103 of the UN Charter.  
 
Similar to the AU, the U.S. also refused to cooperate with the ICC. However, the means used by the 
U.S. to avoid its Heads of State from being prosecuted before the ICC is different; through various 
international agreements with the Signatories, State Parties and non-Parties to the Rome Statute.  
 
The United States’ Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs)120  
 
The BIAs entered into between the U.S. with other States, such as the Signatories, Parties and non-
Parties to the Rome Statute creates similar situation like the AU, the conflict of obligations. The U.S. 
also prevents the ICC from exercising its jurisdiction over U.S. nationals after it withdrew from 
ratifying the Rome Statute in 2002.121 However, the method used by the U.S. is different from the AU. 
Apart from using Article 16 of the Rome Statute to defer investigations or prosecutions for a period 
of 12 months through UNSC Resolutions 1422122 and 1487,123 the U.S. uses Article 98(2) of the Rome 
Statute124 to prevent its current or former Government officials, military or other nationals from being 
exposed to the ICC jurisdiction.  
 
If Article 89 of the Rome Statute obligates its Parties to arrest and surrender the alleged perpetrators 
for committing the crimes, including the Head of State to the ICC upon request made by the ICC, the 
BIAs require them to the opposite. This is because, by virtue of Article 98(2), it stipulates that the ICC 
may not proceed with a request for surrender under Article 89 which would require the requested State 
to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements, unless with prior consent of 
the sending State.125  
Therefore, it raises the question as to whether the BIAs are within the ambit of Article 98(2) of the 
Rome Statute. If this question is in the affirmative, should the Parties to the Rome Statute arrest and 
surrender the alleged perpetrator to the ICC as required under Article 89, or refuse to do so as required 
under the BIAs in the event where crimes have been perpetrated by U.S. nationals on the territory of 
the State Parties to the Rome Statute.  
 
It is argued that the BIAs entered into are not within the ambit of Article 98(2). It is true that Article 
98(2) does not expressly mention that the words “international agreement” refers to the existing or 
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new agreements. However, by looking at the overall provisions under the Rome Statute, such as 
Articles 90(6), 93(3), and 97(c), it qualifies as existing agreements, such as the Status of Forces 
Agreements (SOFAs) but not the new agreements.126   
 
By virtue of that agreements, it protects the exclusive jurisdiction of the sending State over its nationals 
involved in peacekeeping operations, both the troops and civilians127 and thus, ICC cannot proceed 
with the request for the arrest and surrender of the nationals of the sending States except with its prior 
consent.  
 
Even though the words “international agreement” can also qualify as new agreements, it must be 
considered based on the object and purpose of the Rome Statute;128 to prevent the impunity of the 
crimes under the ICC jurisdiction notwithstanding of being the court of the last resort.129 The content 
of the BIAs is silent as to whether the U.S. or other State, in the event of non-surrender of its citizens 
or Head of State to the ICC, should prosecute the alleged perpetrators within its own national court in 
the light of the complementarity principle.  
 
The ICJ in the Case Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite130 ruled that Senegal had 
violated its obligation131 under Article 7(1) of the Convention Against Torture for the delay to 
prosecute its Former Head of State, Hissene Habre which impedes the object and purpose of the 
treaty.132  
 
If a mere delay to prosecute the alleged perpetrators under the treaty breaches State’s obligation as 
well as the object and purpose of the treaty, the BIAs’ non-surrender and silence on the prosecution 
of the alleged perpetrators should have been a clear violation of the obligation and the object and 
purpose of the Rome Statute since it provides impunity where the alleged perpetrators will not be 
prosecuted and walked unpunished.133 Thus, it does not reflect what Justice Jackson, the Chief 
Prosecutor of the IMT from the U.S. have said during the trials of the German Nazi after the outbreak 
of World War II. He contended that, the purpose of having international tribunal is to prosecute the 
alleged perpetrators of international crimes, regardless of their positions as to fulfil humanity’s 
aspirations for justice.134  
 
Therefore, by prohibiting the States to surrender the alleged perpetrators to the ICC, it violates States’ 
obligation pursuant to Article 26 of the VCLT, object and purpose of the Rome Statute under Article 
18 of the VCLT as well as denying the right of the victim for justice as has been promoted by the U.S. 
since the establishment of the IMT in 1945. 
 
However, it is argued that the BIAs are not “international agreements”  under Article 98(2) since the 
word “sending State” is incompatible with the broad definition of the word “persons” under the 
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BIAs.135 Article 98(2) mentions that “the ICC may not proceed with such a request” only for persons 
who have been “sent” by the sending State and should have been present on the territory of the 
requested State at the time of the commission of the alleged crimes.  
 
Since the BIA’s definition of “persons” as current and former Government officials, employees 
(including contractors) or military personnel or nationals of one Party, it creates another question 
whether it also covers former government officials who are not “sent” or no longer been “sent” by the 
sending State but present on the territory of the requested by virtue of their private visit or reside in 
the requested State. Thus, the ICC shall determine the validity and compatibility of the “international 
agreements” under Article 98(2) before it uses its power to request for the arrest and surrender of a 
person under Article 89. 
 
Even if one contends that the BIAs are valid and compatible with Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute, 
it is still argued that the BIAs are void and have similar effect with the AU decision under Article 53 
of the VCLT for contradicting the jus cogens norm. For the BIAs to be considered as void and invalid 
under Article 53 of the VCLT, it must first be examined whether the BIAs are “treaties” in the eyes of 
the VCLT. Article 2(1)(a) of the VCLT stipulates that a treaty means “an international agreement 
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law”.  
 
Since the BIAs are entered into between the U.S. and other States, such as Benin, Botswana and 
Cambodia, they are caught under the definition of treaty abovementioned. However, one may question 
whether the BIAs, which have the word “agreement” should also be considered as “treaty” under 
Article 2(1)(a) of the VCLT.  
 
Regardless of the terms used by the Parties,136 such as “convention”, “Protocol”, or “agreement”, it is 
still considered as a treaty under Article 2(1)(a) as long as it is entered into between States as ruled by 
the ICJ in Qatar v Bahrain.137 However, some international law scholars, like Alina Kaczorowska138 
argue that not all international agreements are treaties even though they have been entered into 
between States by looking at the contents of the agreements. She contended that the content of the 
agreements, either expressly or impliedly may be governed by municipal law, but not international 
law. Still, the contents of the BIAs are silent on their governing law and this allows them to be 
considered as treaties by virtue of Article 2(1)(a) of the VCLT.  
 
Still, there are other alternative legal mechanisms that can prevent both the AU and the U.S. from 
using the Assembly decision as well as the BIAs as an excuse from fulfilling their obligations under 
the international law and treaties, such as through the Genocide Convention 1948, Geneva 
Conventions 1949 and the Convention Against Torture 1984. 
 
Alternative Means 
 
Since the crimes of genocide, war crimes and torture under the ICC jurisdiction are also based on 
various treaties, such as the Genocide Convention 1948, The Geneva Conventions 1949 and 
Convention Against Torture 1986, States which are Parties to these treaties are still obliged to 
prosecute or surrender the alleged perpetrators before a competent tribunal for prosecutions.  
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For instance, there are 142 Parties to the Genocide Convention 1948, including almost all the AU 
Members, Sudan as well as the U.S,139 where they have the legal obligation under the Genocide 
Convention 1948 to arrest persons accused for genocide even if the crime has been committed outside 
its territories and hand them to competent national or international tribunals as ruled by the ICJ in the 
Genocide Case.140  
 
In addition, the ICJ Advisory Opinion in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case141 ruled 
that States which are not Parties to the Genocide Convention are still bound under the obligations 
enshrined under the Genocide Convention 1948 since they are principles which are recognised by 
civilised nations, or jus cogens.  
  
Similar to Article 27 of the Rome Statute, Article IV of the Genocide Convention also does not provide 
immunity to the Heads of State. Even if Sudan argued that it has no obligation to arrest its own 
President and refused to waive his immunity under Article 27 of the Rome Statute, still it has the 
obligation to do so after ratifying the Genocide Convention. Thus, when the ICC issued the second 
arrest warrant against the Sudanese President for allegedly committed genocide, both Sudan and AU 
Members which are Parties to the Genocide Convention are under the obligation to arrest him.142  
 
In addition, Article VI of the Genocide Convention provides that alleged criminals can be tried by an 
international penal tribunal which have jurisdiction over the crime where the Parties accepted the 
jurisdiction. Since the ICC has jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, the ICC can exercise its 
jurisdiction over Sudanese President. Even though Sudan is not a Party to the Rome Statute and does 
not accept the ICC’s jurisdiction over genocide, it is still bound under the UNSC referral pursuant to 
Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute which has been exercised through Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
under Resolution 1593.   
 
Therefore, the obligations under the Genocide Conventions supersedes the BIAs and the AU decision 
where it has been proven that both the AU decision and the BIAs provide impunity to the alleged 
perpetrators where the AU refused to arrest the Sudanese President and no prosecution has ever 
mentioned under the BIAs. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It has been established that there will be no immunity to both the sitting and former Head of State for 
allegedly committed the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes as such crimes 
have been prohibited under international law. With regards to the AU Member States, they are bound 
under the Article 25 and 103 of the UN Charter, Article 89 of the Rome Statute, Article VI of the 
Genocide Convention 1948 to arrest President Omar Al-Bashir and the decision made by the Assembly 
of the AU is void under Article 53 of the VCLT since it is inconsistent with the obligation under both 
the UN Charter and jus cogens norms. In relation to the BIAs in which the U.S. has entered into, the 
obligation of non-surrender of the alleged perpetrators under the BIAs is not in line with the obligation 
to arrest and surrender the alleged perpetrators. Also, it is contrary with the object and purpose of the 
Rome Statute to end the impunity, in which the Rome Statute Signatories and State Parties are bound 
to follow.  
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